克里普斯使团
克里普斯使团(英语:Cripps Mission)是英国政府于1942年3月下旬进行的一次不成功的尝试,目的为争取印度对其第二次世界大战军事投入的充分合作与支持。此使团由高级部长及下议院领袖斯塔福·克里普斯领导。克里普斯属于左翼的工党,此党传统上同情印度自治,但他同时也是由时任英国首相温斯顿·丘吉尔领导的联合战时内阁成员。丘吉尔长期以来一直是阻碍印度独立运动的领导者。
克里普斯受命与抱持民族主义的印度国民大会党领袖, 包括甘地 ,以及作为印度次大陆穆斯林人口代表的穆罕默德·阿里·真纳及其领导的全印穆斯林联盟进行谈判,希望达成协议。克里普斯努力让印度为英国参战效忠,以换取承诺: 一旦战争结束, 将举行选举,并给予完全自治 (即自治领地地位)。克里普斯与印度领导人讨论由他亲自起草的提案,并将其公布。国大党拒绝接受使团的提案,因为他们深知当时英国正处于一个较为弱势的谈判地位。
国大党工作委员会于1942年8月利用英国政府的弱势, 呼吁对方必须同意"退出印度"(Quit India)的要求, 否则国大党将诉诸公民不服从运动,并号召人民抵抗和违反政府权威。英属印度政府则以监禁几乎所有国大党的领导层,直到战争结束以作回应。克里普斯曾向真纳提议, 赋予全印穆斯林联盟选择退出未来印度联邦的权利。由于真纳与他的穆斯林同胞支持英国投入战争,他们在英国人眼中地位为之提升。[1][2]真纳对于他们能获得退出未来联邦的权利感到惊讶。[3]
背景
[编辑]《1935年印度政府法案》是在圆桌会议、西蒙委员会和之前通过的《1919年印度政府法案》的基础之上制定,要求建立一个全印度联邦 ,这个联邦让印度人在最高层级的治理中占有更大的份额。
然而印度的各个土邦与国大党之间,以及全印穆斯林联盟与国大党之间存有深刻的意见分歧,导致进程受到延迟。而此法案中只有省级部分得以执行。
英国在1939年9月向德国宣战后,印度总督林利思戈勋爵未经咨询印度政治领袖或民选的省级代表,就宣布印度成为站在英国一方的参战者,此举无疑暴露出印度在迈向自治这条道路上的进展已出现停滞。[4]因而在国大党内部引起强烈不满,导致他们要求英国立即移交权力。由此产生的僵局令国大党的省级政府集体总辞, 而引发印度可能发生民众叛乱和政治混乱的局面。
全印穆斯林联盟、印度大会和地方政党则以换取各种让步为条件, 而支持英国及其战争投入。印度总督、国大党和全印穆斯林联盟之间持续进行谈判, 但以失败收场,形成一个政治僵局。
日本于1941年12月向荷兰、英国和美国宣战,将政治局势改变。 英国的信心随着1942年2月15日新加坡沦陷(这是英国在战争中最大的单一挫败),以及侵入印度,英国军队被迫撤退,大批印度军队被俘,而跌至谷底。日本入侵印度的威胁眼见迫在眉睫, 人们对"第五纵队",特别是与日本合作的国大党激进分子可能伺机而动而感到焦虑。
英国战时内阁是一个民族团结的联合组织,在是否与国大党妥协的问题上存在意见分歧。来自工党的部长和保守党中的温和派热衷于推动印度的自治进程,方式是不危及战争投入。首相温斯顿·丘吉尔强烈反对任何瓦解大英帝国的行为,并认为其非白人臣民没能力自治。事实上,他的尖锐观点,以及他反对保守党领袖斯坦利·鲍德温赞同达成与印度国民大会党合作以实现自治的协议,是他十年以来在保守党内被孤立的原因之一。他的观点得到同样是保守党的印度事务大臣里奥·艾默里的支持。
然而,英国的主要盟友 - 美国对事态的看法更具急迫感。美国的主要战略目标是援助蒋介石领导,实际上已被孤立的国民政府中国,以对抗正在扩张中的大日本帝国。由于日本已占领中国沿海地区,表示美国需要印度作为一个主要的后勤枢纽,输送物资以援助中国,并需要印度的军事人力来确保经由缅甸的补给路线不受干扰。美国和中国的领导层深信,如果缺乏动员起来的印度民众的全力支持,此将无法实现,因而要求英国与印度国民大会党的谈判达成突破性进展。此外,罗斯福总统领导的政府正忙于制定其战后世界秩序的愿景,并出于意识形态和商业两方面的考量,认为亚洲去殖民化}符合美国国家利益。
虽然英、美两国间存在利益冲突,但英国的参战非常依赖美国透过租借法案提供武器及物资补给。表示必须至少在表面上认真对待来自美国总统的压力,尤其是英国在东南亚处于军事失利的情况下。英国内阁因此在1942年3月9日同意派遣使团前往印度,讨论对方的提议。克里普斯的飞机于3月22日在德里降落。英国于那时已愿意在战争结束时赋予印度独立。[5]使团抵达的第二日(3月23日)恰巧是1940年全印穆斯林联盟通过拉合尔决议的第二周年纪念日,因此克里普斯看到街上有穆斯林手持绿色旗帜游行。[6]
克里普斯表示他虽然曾更亲近国大党,但他愿意接受其他观点。真纳则等待了解使团提案的内容,并声明如果提案不符合穆斯林的利益,他们将会拒绝。[7]
合作或抗议的争论
[编辑]国大党内部对于印度卷入第二次世界大战该采的应对措施也并非一致。纵然欧洲战局严峻,甚至威胁到英国自身的自由,但仍有一些国大党领袖主张发动起义来反抗英国。另一些人,如查克拉瓦尔蒂·拉贾戈巴拉查理则主张向英国递出橄榄枝,在这个关键时刻支持他们,希望这个姿态能在战后得到独立作为回报。国大党的主要领导人甘地反对印度参战,因为他不愿从道德上认可战争。甘地怀疑英国的意图,且相信英国对印度的独立愿望缺乏诚意。然而查克拉瓦尔蒂·拉贾戈巴拉查理在萨达尔·瓦拉巴伊·帕特尔、阿布·卡拉姆·阿扎德和贾瓦哈拉尔·尼赫鲁的支持下,与克里普斯举行会谈,并提出以立即自治和最终独立为条件,给予英国全力支持。
英国急切试图在战争期间争取南亚穆斯林的支持,因此在提案中加入一项条款,规定任何省份都无须被迫加入战后的印度联邦。[8]全印穆斯林联盟的领袖真纳支持参战,并谴责国大党的政策。他坚持建立巴基斯坦 (一个单独的穆斯林国家),抵制国大党关于泛印度合作和立即独立的呼吁。
克里普斯在印度
[编辑]
克里普斯抵达印度后,与印度领袖举行会谈,试图以他的提案来满足所有族群。他是贾瓦哈拉尔·尼赫鲁的朋友, 并竭尽所能以达成协议。[9]然而, 由于(双方)之间的不信任感太深,许多具有影响力的人士(指英国殖民统治阶层及印度本土政治领袖)都不乐见这次谈判达成任何和解。[10]关于丘吉尔和印度事务大臣里奥·艾默里授权克里普斯向印度民族主义政治家提供什么内容,存在一些争议或含糊不清的地方。而克里普斯同时也面临来自总督林利思戈的敌意。克里普斯首先提出在战争结束时赋予印度完全自治领地的地位,且有机会脱离英联邦,走向完全独立。克里普斯在私底下还承诺罢黜林利思戈,并立即赋予印度自治领地地位,而仅坚持日后的印度国防部必须由英国人执掌。
然而克里普斯在公开场合未能提出任何关于短期内更大程度自治的具体提案,只有一模糊的承诺 ,即增加总督行政委员会中印度籍成员的数量。克里普斯将大部分时间花在鼓励国大党领袖和真纳达成一个共同的、公开的协议,以支持参战和英国政府。
英国与国大党之间在此阶段的信任感已达极低的程度,双方都认为对方隐瞒自身真实的计划。国大党因而停止与克里普斯会谈,其全国领导层在甘地的指导下,要求以立即自治来换取对参战的支持。甘地表示,克里普斯提出的战后自治领地地位的提议"是开一张由一家即将倒闭的银行负责支付的期票"。
全印穆斯林联盟的反应
[编辑]真纳辩称,这些提案仅是一份草拟的宣言,并未满足他的要求,且是倾向于组织一个统一印度的方案。他在四月的一次记者会上提出在提案中没有明确为巴基斯坦的议题上让步,他进一步表达对穆斯林自决权遭忽视的担忧。他也为全印穆斯林联盟被排除在后续阶段的谈判之外提出批评。[11][12][13]
退出印度运动
[编辑]甘地和印度国民大会党在英国仍然不予回应时,开始策划一场大型的民众起义,即退出印度运动 , 要求英国立即撤离印度。[14]随着日军征服缅甸,并逼近印度,印度人察觉到英国已没有能力保卫印度的领土。日本的入侵部队中包含有印度国民军的成员,此部队由苏巴斯·钱德拉·鲍斯创建和领导,目的为结束英国对印度的控制。它由印度人组成,其中大多数是在1942年初新加坡沦陷时被俘虏的印度军人。
真纳的全印穆斯林联盟则对退出印度运动提出谴责, 并参与省级政府和英属印度政府的立法会议。他鼓励穆斯林参与战争。英国有了这种合作,得以在整个战争期间继续管理印度,倘若找不到印度政治人物来管理,便动用官员和军事人员来替代。然而此种做法从长远来看,证明并不可行 。
使团任务失败的主因
[编辑]克里普斯使团失败的原因主要有两点,为:
- 所提供的所有承诺都必须在战后才能兑现。
- 总督林利思戈和印度事务大臣艾默里在幕后破坏使团的工作。
印度历史学家帕尔塔·萨拉蒂·古普塔根据1970年代公开的英国政府文件后撰写的文章,[15]指向是上述第二点的缘故。林利思戈和艾默里之间的电报讯息揭示两人都反对克里普斯使团,并故意破坏克里普斯付出的心力。英国政府利用克里普斯使团作为其自由殖民政策的证据,但个人和私人信函则揭示此两者对使团的蔑视,以及对任务失败感觉欣喜异常。[16]
长期影响
[编辑]克里普斯使团任务失败所导致的长期影响,直到战后才真正变得明显。因为随着大量英军复员返乡, 英国政府面临巨大的内外部压力。即便丘吉尔也承认,克里普斯提出的独立提议已无法收回 。然而丘吉尔在战争结束时已下台,只能眼睁睁看着由克莱曼·艾德礼领导的工党政府赋予印度独立。这种"英国即将离开"的信心, 在国大党政治人物在1945年至1946年的选举中踊跃参选,并组建省级政府的积极性上即可看出。[17]
参考文献
[编辑]- ^ Paul Addison, The Road to 1945 (1975) p 201
- ^ William Roger Louis. Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization. I.B.Tauris. 2006: 387–400. ISBN 9781845113476.
- ^ Ian Talbot; Gurharpal Singh. The Partition of India. Cambridge University Press. 2009-07-23: 35. ISBN 978-0-521-85661-4.
Cripps' proposals also included a proviso that no part of India would be forced to join the postwar arrangements; though the mission ended in failure, the Muslim League emerged with its prestige and standing further enhanced. Indeed, Jinnah at the time of his interview with Cripps had been 'rather surprised' to see how far his declaration went 'to meeting the Pakistan case'.
- ^ Ayesha Jalal. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan. Cambridge U.P. 1994: 47. ISBN 9780521458504.
- ^ Barbara D. Metcalf; Thomas R. Metcalf. A Concise History of India. Cambridge University Press. 2002: 202–. ISBN 978-0-521-63974-3.
By the time of the flying visit of Sir Stafford Cripps to Delhi in April 1942, the British were willing to offer India independence, by the convening of a constituent assembly, at the end of the war, but with the important proviso that no unwilling portion of the country should be forced to join the new state.
- ^ Wolpert, Stanley. Shameful Flight (The last years of British Empire in India). Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press. 2006: 17–18. ISBN 978-0-19-906606-3.
- ^ Sandhu, Akhtar Hussain. Cripps Mission Proposals And Muslim-Sikh Relations on the British Punjab. Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan: 12.
Sir Stafford arrived in India on 23 March 1942 and gave a statement saying that he had been more associated with his friends in the Congress party but also indicating that he was opened to all other points of view. In the meantime, the Muslim League was celebrating its Pakistan day celebrations. Jinnah in his speech, referred to the Cripps mission advising Muslims to be patient until his proposals were put forward officially. He indicated that the League will not accept his proposals if it were detrimental to Muslim interest; he also mentioned that he will resist and if needed, the Muslims would die fighting for the creation of Pakistan.
- ^ Barbara D. Metcalf; Thomas R. Metcalf. A Concise History of Modern India. Cambridge University Press. 2012-09-24: 209–. ISBN 978-1-139-53705-6.
The British, in their anxiety to secure Muslim support during the war, helped it along by such acts as the provision in the Cripps proposals that allowed provinces to 'opt out' of any independent India.
- ^ Sandhu, Akhtar Hussain. Cripps Mission Proposals And Muslim-Sikh Relations on the British Punjab. Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan: 12.
Cripps tried to accommodate all the communities in his proposals.
- ^ Sandhu, Akhtar Hussain. Cripps Mission Proposals And Muslim-Sikh Relations on the British Punjab. Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan: 12.
Cripps tried to accommodate all the communities in his proposals.
- ^ Sandhu, Akhtar Hussain. Cripps Mission Proposals And Muslim-Sikh Relations on the British Punjab. Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan: 12.
The Congress on 2 April 1942 signalled its opposition to the Cripps Proposals. The Congress and Sikhs rejected these proposals due to the possibility of the India's partition with the provision that provinces could opt out of a future Indian Constituent Assembly while the League rejected it finding no clear-cut acceptance of Pakistan. Quaid-i-Azam expressed his dismay at the refusal to recognise the right of Muslim self determination while addressing the annual session of the All India Muslim League at Allahabad: '...the Musalmans feel deeply disappointed that the entity ad integrity of the Muslim nation has not been expressly recognised...Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the right of national self determination is unequivocally recognised. It must be realised that India was never a country or a nation....It has roused our deepest anxieties and grave apprehensions, especially with reference to the Pakistan scheme, which is a matter of life and death for Muslim India...'
- ^ Abid, Massarrat. Partition Demand: From Cripps Mission to Gandhi-Jinnah Talks. Journal of Pakistan Vision. 31 December 2010, 11 (2).
On 29 March, Cripps released his documents and held a press conference. On 4 April, in his presidential address to the Muslim League, Jinnah pointed out that Cripps proposals were only a draft declaration. He also said that creation of Pakistan was a remote possibility and there was a definite preference for a new Indian Union which was the main objective and suggestion and the draft declaration interviews and explanations of Sir Stafford were going against Muslim interests and the League was called upon to play the game with a loaded dice. He asked Cripps to make adjustments in order to give real effect to the Pakistan demand. On 13 April 1942, at a press conference, he pointed out that Pakistan demand was not conceded clearly and the right of Muslims to self determination was also denied. These proposals were therefore rejected by the Muslim League. Jinnah criticized the British Government and Congress party for another round of negotiations, ignoring the Muslim League at a later stage.
- ^ Ayesha Jalal. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan. Cambridge University Press. 28 April 1994: 81–. ISBN 978-1-139-93570-8.
Provincial option, he argued, was clearly an insufficient security. An explicit acceptance of the principle of Pakistan offered the only safeguard for Muslim interests throughout India and had to be the precondition for any advance at the centre. So he exhorted all Indian Muslims to unite under his leadership to force the British and the Congress to concede 'Pakistan'. If the real reasons for Jinnah's rejection of the offer were rather different, it was not Jinnah but his rivals who had failed to make the point publicly.
- ^ Chakrabarty, Bidyut. Political Mobilization in the Localities: The 1942 Quit India Movement in Midnapur. Modern Asian Studies. 1992, 26 (4): 791–814. ISSN 0026-749X.
- ^ Shyam Ratna Gupta, "New Light on the Cripps Mission," India Quarterly, (Jan 1972), 28#1 pp 69-74
- ^ Shyam Ratna Gupta, "New Light on the Cripps Mission," India Quarterly, (Jan 1972), 28#1 pp 69-74.
- ^ Judith Brown Modern India. The making of an Asian Democracy (2nd ed. 1999) pp. 328–30.
资料来源
[编辑]- Clarke, Peter. The Cripps Version: The Life of Sir Stafford Cripps 1889-1952 (2003) pp 276–370.
- Clymer, Kenton J. "Franklin D. Roosevelt, Louis Johnson, India, and Anticolonialism: Another Look," Pacific Historical Review, (Aug 1988), 57#3 pp 261–284 in JSTOR
- Gandhi, Rajmohan, Patel: A Life (2008)
- Moore, R. J. Churchill, Cripps and India (Oxford) 1979 chapters 3-5
- Moore, R. J. "The mystery of the Cripps mission," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies Volume 11, Issue 3, 1973, pages 195-213 online doi:10.1080/14662047308447190
- Owen, Nicholas. "The Cripps mission of 1942: A reinterpretation." Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 30.1 (2002): 61–98. doi:10.1080/03086530208583134
主要资料
[编辑]- Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume IV, The Hinge of Fate, (1950) Book One, Chapter 12, "India—The Cripps Mission"; limited preview of the whole chapter at Google Books
- Mansergh, Nicholas, ed., Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power.' Vol. 1: 'The Cripps Mission January–April 1942 (1970).
外部链接
[编辑]- Draft resolution
- Indian History[被篡夺]
- Cripp's India Mission[被篡夺]
- October Offer regarding India’s constitution, of His Majesty's Government 18 October 1939
- August Offer regarding India’s constitution, of His Majesty's Government 8 August 1940